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Introduction 
 Because of the rising economic interdependencies and discussion on 
globalization, it is really common to explain different developments in the world 
politics through the lens of neoliberalism, and especially through one of the most 
influential neoliberal theories, the theory of interdependence.  
The neoliberal theory of interdependence, created by the liberal institutionalists 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye highlights that a relationship between the two 
partners can be seen as interconnected or interdependent. Still, there is always a more 
powerful party and it leads to the asymmetry of this interdependence. Asymmetry refers 
to higher costs to one partner, thus making it more dependent and potentially be a 
subject to power from the other actor (Lilliestam & Ellenbeck 2011: 3382). In order to 
understand how partners influence each other, the sensitivity and vulnerability of both 
must be assessed. The theory stresses that more sensitive partners try to escape the 
interdependence and more vulnerable ones try to strengthen it (Keohane and Nye 1989: 
12-13). 
The theory of interdependence has been used in international political economy 
for some time now (Casier 2011: 497) and it is also suitable to talk about 
interdependence in energy relations and particularly concerning the issue of energy 
security. With the rising of overall demand for oil and gas and instability in many 
producer countries, relationships change rapidly between energy producers and 
consumers states, thus also affecting the balance of power in interdependent 
relationships (Umbach 2010: 1230). In these asymmetrical conditions, the issue of 
energy security inevitably rises. It is very important though, to consider not only the 
security of the supply, but also the security of the demand of interdependent partners. 
The theory of interdependence makes it possible to integrate the security of demand and 
supply with vulnerability and sensitivity of interdependent partners. 
 The EU and the Russian Federation are closely interdependent in terms of 
energy and logically, the issue of energy security is one of the most important aspects of 
the interdependent relations between the two (Tichy 2012a: 1). Although the 
relationship between Russia and the EU is interdependent, it is clearly visible that the 
EU and Russia have different approaches to its energy policies and derived from it, a 
different perception of the nature of their interdependence. Based on the theory of 
interdependence, European Union, due to its huge demand, might be considered really 
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sensitive and Russia due to its need to sell the energy products might be considered 
really vulnerable.  
Approach proposed by this thesis focuses on the above mentioned 
interconnection between the two partners, the EU and Russia, which is clearly defined 
by the neoliberal interdependence theory. Based on the latter, the following hypothesis 
can be derived: the issue of energy security in the relations between the EU and Russia 
rises because of the asymmetrical interdependence, with Russia as a supplier trying to 
strengthen interdependence due to its demand vulnerability, and the EU rather wanting 
to see the interdependence more negative due to its supply sensitivity. 
 In order to prove the hypothesis, the paper tries to analyze and explain the 
different approaches to energy security through the energy policies of both the EU and 
Russia, and show that through its policies one partner wants to strengthen and another 
weaken interdependence. Then, by assessing the sensitivity and vulnerability of 
interdependent partners, the existence of asymmetry and the fact that it causes the issue 
of energy security to rise, can be proved. To ensure the main aim of this paper, 
following questions have to be answered: What are the objectives of energy security in 
the policies of both the EU and Russia and how do they relate to each other? What 
effect has the asymmetrical interdependence on the perception of energy security of 
both partners? 
 The theoretical framework of the neoliberal theory of interdependence is 
introduced in the first chapter. The second chapter applies the theory of interdependence 
to the case of energy and focuses on the issue of energy security through the neoliberal 
prism of interdependence. Following chapters apply this framework to an empirical case 
of the energy relations and the issue of energy security between European Union and the 
Russian Federation. For that, firstly, the objectives of energy security in the dialogue 
and policies of both the EU and Russia will be analyzed, and secondly, the level of 
energy security in the interdependent relations of the European Union and the Russian 
Federation will be evaluated. 
 
1. Neoliberal theory of interdependence 
Neoliberalism accepts that conflict remains a basic feature of world politics, 
although cooperation is to be encountered frequently in the international system as well 
(Proedrou 2007: 329). One of the most influential neoliberal theories is the theory of 
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interdependence (Binhack & Tichy 2012: 54) which is clearly presented by Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye.  
  Keohane and Nye (1989: 9) define interdependence as a situation in which 
“across state borders, intensive transactions (flows of money, goods, persons and 
information) are taking place, entailing certain expenses.” As they put it, 
interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effect 
among countries or among actors in different countries (Keohane & Nye 1989: 8). Since 
the actors have an effect on each other, this process includes gains and losses (Binhack 
& Tichy 2012: 55).  
 However, this interdependence is bound to be asymmetrical. Asymmetric 
interdependence can easily serve as the main source of power, because the mighty 
exploit the dependence of the weaker in order to gain benefits (Proedrou 2007: 332). 
Keohane and Nye (1989: 11) themselves stress that asymmetries in dependence is the 
exact reason why one actor can influence another, and less dependent actors can often 
use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue. It 
is precisely the asymmetry of the interdependence and the fact that potential costs are 
higher for one party than the other, that creates a potential source of tension (Casier 
2011: 497). Interdependence, thus, is only a descriptive term that discloses mutual 
dependence (Proedrou 2007: 332). 
 An interdependent trading relationship can truly be highly dynamic. Already the 
threat of a disruption may be reason enough for one or both parties to prepare for future 
conflicts. The dependent actor will be especially sensitive to changes in perceived threat 
level and may take measures to reduce this dependence. Thus, the initial asymmetries of 
the interdependence as well as the development of the asymmetry in the future may 
result to serious conflicts between the partners (Lilliestam & Ellenbeck 2011: 3382). 
An unequal distribution of gains and expenses lying at the heart of asymmetrical 
interdependence secures the source of power. There are two dimensions that are 
important for the understanding of the role of power in interdependent relations; these 
are sensitivity and vulnerability (Binhack & Tichy 2012: 55).  
 
1.1. Sensitivity and vulnerability 
For Keohane and Nye (1989: 12) sensitivity interdependence is created by 
interactions within a framework of policies. Sensitivity involves degrees of 
responsiveness within a policy framework (Keohane & Nye 1989: 12). In other words, 
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sensitivity refers to the costs that each side suffers when the other state does not offer it 
the benefits it should get from their relationship (Proedrou 2007: 332).  
Proedrou (2007: 332) also adds that high sensitivity makes states understand the 
possible consequences of their interdependence on third parties and thus is a driver for 
change. It leads states to take up actions to reduce their dependence and to search for 
alternative schemes of cooperation that would lower the intensity of their dependence 
on third parties. 
Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs by external 
events and it can only be measured by the costliness of making effective adjustments to 
a changed environment over a period of time (Keohane & Nye 1989: 13). Vulnerability 
thus, is the degree of weakness of an interdependent state if the other attempts to finish 
their interdependent relationship (Proedrou 2007: 332). Interdependent parties with 
relatively high vulnerability tend to cooperate and strengthen their interdependent 
relationship in order to bind the other side even more tightly into it and thus prevent any 
potential unilateral withdrawals. 
 
1.2. Positive and negative interdependence 
As explained by Keohane (1986: 8), positive interdependence refers to 
“exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are 
contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for 
good.” Positive interdependence thus creates the situation, where both sides are willing 
to depend on each other (Belyi 2012). 
Negative interdependence on the contrary results to the fact that partners would 
pleasurably escape from a dependency (Belyi 2012). It happens, when a relationship 
cannot be considered mutually beneficial and from one side the partnership is based on 
self-interest (Keohane 1986: 8). The shift from one to another is certainly possible. 
Positive or negative interdependence is at its widest scope the most clearly 
visible in the policies of the two partners. If one side’s national regulations limit the 
opportunities for partnership to grow, there will be no progress in such relationship. In 
fact, policies often show how willing one side is to continue the positive 
interdependence or how eager it is to escape such interdependence. 
To develop positive interdependence, a constructive dialogue between partners 
must be established. Probable cause of insufficient dialogue might be the asymmetry of 
interdependence. The threatened side often tries to reduce the interdependence by 
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creating additional requirements to the other partner or searching for alternative 
potential partnerships. 
 
2. Application of interdependence theory to the issue of energy security 
Energy can be understood as a commodity, which is traded on markets that are 
extremely interconnected. It creates situations, where actors become more and more 
interdependent. Tichy (2012a: 5) points out that the relative strength of energy 
interdependence can be measured by such factors, as energy trade balance, level of 
energy resources, possibilities of energy diversification and specific total energy 
consumption in the country. 
It is important to stress, that interdependency is favored in many sectors, but 
while addressing energy, we speak about self-sufficiency. Hence, it is important to 
address the role of definition of energy security. As pointed out by Belyi (2003: 353), 
the rate of energy consumption has steadily been increasing, as well as the energy 
import dependency of many states, which lead to many conflicts in connection to 
natural resources. This had created the situation, where at some point the political aspect 
had to be included to discussion of energy issues. It resulted in the need for new terms, 
one of which is energy security (Casier 2011; 495). 
 
2.1. Defining energy security 
There are indeed many definitions of energy security and they need to be 
highlighted in order to understand how countries interpret their energy security, and 
stemming from it, when does energy security become an issue between two partners. 
Energy security may refer to “a reliable and uninterrupted supply of energy sufficient to 
meet the needs of the economy at the same time, coming at a reasonable price” (Jun, 
Kim & Chang 2009: 1896) or simply, the availability of a regular supply of energy at an 
affordable price (Costantini, Gracceva, Markandya & Vicini 2007: 210). Based on that 
definition, the European Commission (2000: 65-66) suggested four dimensions of 
energy security: physical, economic, social, and environmental; and also long- and 
short-term dimensions. 
A physical dimension can be described with the situation when an energy source 
is exhausted or production is stopped, temporarily or permanently. The unsteady prices 
of energy products on the world markets, which in turn can be caused by a threat of a 
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physical disruption of supplies illustrates the economic dimension of energy security. 
Speculative price movements in expectancy of a potential disruption of supplies can 
also be a great problem, since it leads to panic buying even when supply and demand 
are apparently in balance. It results in sharp price rises, which directly affect business 
costs and the purchasing power of private consumers.  
The instability of energy supplies may also cause serious social disruption. Since 
oil still remains vital for the functioning of the economy, any disruption of supply is 
likely to lead to social demands, and possible social conflict. Also, there are many 
environmental concerns about damage to the ecosystems caused by the energy chain. 
These concerns include accidents, such as oil spills, nuclear accidents and methane 
leaks, or results of polluting emissions (urban pollution and greenhouse gas emissions). 
Also, the definition of energy security can be seen from a short-term perspective 
or a long-term perspective. In the short term, the concern is with the impact of an 
unexpected cut in supply or rise in price. In the long term, the concern is more with the 
availability of sufficient energy that allows stable and sustainable economic 
development. 
Thus, based on previous definitions, it is clear, that interdependence theory can 
explain the issue of energy security in asymmetrical relations of two partners by 
measuring sensitivity and vulnerability of both actors. In the case of energy, sensitivity 
refers, for example, to reduction of energy supplies or withholding payments for the 
energy bought. On the other hand, an actor might be considered vulnerable if after a 
sudden end of an interdependent relationship, there is a lack of alternative sources.  
The asymmetry of interdependence is determined by the difference between 
energy exporter and importer costs. The actor with the higher costs is the more 
dependent actor and may be subject to power from the other actor (Lilliestam & 
Ellenbeck 2011: 3382) and thus may face the risks of source dependence, transit 
dependence and facility dependence (Spanjer 2007: 2890). If both costs are equally 
high, the relationship is stable and no actor has power over the other (Lilliestam & 
Ellenbeck 2011: 3382). The key is that asymmetry of interdependence is the one that 
causes the issue of energy security to rise. Thus, it is important to take into 
consideration both, the demand and supply side. 
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2.2. Security of energy demand and supply 
Kaveshnikov (2010: 586) believes that energy security is often analyzed in a 
very restricted manner - as security of supply only. He stresses that historically 
speaking, the concept of energy security was born in consumer countries which, 
naturally, were primarily guided by their own interests and concerns, and thus it tends to 
focus on the security of supply.  
Still, analyzing security of supply separately from security of demand enhances 
risks for consumers in energy planning, and therefore both sides of energy security must 
be linked, since a reliable energy policy should integrate concerns of all actors involved. 
The same point has also been made by Salem-Haghighi (2007: 13), who stresses that the 
difference must be made between security measures on the demand side and those on 
the supply side. 
To illustrate how complicated energy security issue can be according to division 
of demand/supply and sensitivity/vulnerability, the following matrix can be combined. 
 
 Sensitivity Vulnerability 
Demand Demand sensitivity Demand vulnerability 
Supply Supply sensitivity Supply vulnerability 
 
Graph 1. Matrix of supply/demand and sensitivity/vulnerability in the energy 
sector; based on Casier 2011 
 
In order to fully understand that the issue of energy security rises due to the 
asymmetrical interdependence, the thorough evaluation of national energy policies must 
be made, because for the future, it is vitally important to be able to implement measures 
that will allow an effective response to the threat from energy insecurity (Costantini, et 
al. 2007: 211). Still, most importantly, it is the national policies that make possible the 
evaluation of how strongly partners want to be attached to one another, thus evaluating 
if interdependence is positive or negative. 
The similar patterns of interdependence are visible in the clearly interdependent 
relationship of the EU and the Russian Federation in the energy sector. If the foregoing 
chapter introduced the application of the theory of interdependence in terms of energy 
and the issue of energy security, the following chapters will focus on the case study of 
the EU-Russia energy relations and the issue of energy security in them. 
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3. The case of EU-Russia: energy security in national energy policies 
 The EU–Russian energy partnership is definitely based on mutual dependence, 
with vast majority of the EU’s gas imports coming from Russia and a large portion of 
Russia’s governmental revenues stemming from the export of natural resources to EU 
member states (Neuman 2010: 344). For Russia, energy, and especially its security, 
owns the central place in its foreign policy, while Europe has responded with several 
policies and projects aimed at decreasing energy dependence from Russia (Norberg 
2009: 9). The European Union’s energy policy also seems to be less clear (Neuman 
2010: 345) because of the diverse positions of the EU member states (Bozhilova & 
Hashimoto 2010: 628). All in all, Hadfield (2008: 232) finds that Russia and the EU 
symbolize polar opposites of the foreign energy policy spectrum. 
 The EU–Russian energy dialogue has not lead to any constructive result 
(Norberg 2009: 9), because it is composed of a series of interrelated, yet significantly 
diverse bilateral relations (Bozhilova & Hashimoto 2010: 628). The dialogue between 
the two has clearly been inefficient due to the radically different perceptions held by 
both sides of energy security (Hadfield 2008: 244). 
 This chapter analyzes partners’ main positions in their national energy policies, 
and the importance of the issue of energy security in them. Also, in order to understand 
possible reasons of energy security issues, a short review of overall tendencies in EU-
Russia energy dialogue will be presented. 
 
3.1. Energy security and interdependence in the European Union energy policy 
 The energy policy framework of the European Union consists of a series of 
regulations and initiatives with different objectives and affects various actors in the 
energy field (Oikonomou, Flamos, Zeugolis & Grafakos 2012: 177). Although efforts 
have been made to achieve a common EU energy policy, the Union is still stumbling 
upon the task of developing a common external energy policy (Neuman 2010: 345). 
Belyi (2011: 2) adds that EU energy policy cannot be understood without taking into 
consideration the complex nature of the EU system itself, which represents a 
combination of economic interests and competences of the European Community and 
the geopolitical views of its member states. Therefore, not only one, but several 
documents have to be taken into consideration. 
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 It is crucially important to take into consideration “The Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement”, which came into force in 1997. It stated the EU’s full-fledged 
partnership and readiness to continue its positive interdependency with Russia. This 
agreement provided a legal basis for ongoing political dialogue between Russia and the 
EU across a wide variety of areas, including energy (European Commission 1997). 
Scholars point out that although this agreement did not cover the issue of energy 
security and is often referred to as “fundamentally limited” (Hadfield 2008: 235), it can 
still be considered as the legal basis that defines bilateral political, economic and 
cultural relations between the EU and Russia (Bilgin 2011: 120). 
 An important attempt towards shaping common energy policy in the EU was 
"Green Paper on Energy Security" prepared by the European Commission’s Directorate 
General on Transport and Energy. Published in year 2000, the document was truly 
efficient in pointing out the extent of the EU’s energy dependency, especially in 
relations with Russia, claiming it to be rising (European Commission 2000: 22-23). 
Tichy (2012a: 7) sees the main goal of this document to increase the EU’s energy 
security by gradually bringing question of energy security under the competence of the 
European Communities, at the expense of member-states’ sovereignty. As pointed out 
by Dimitrova (2012: 24), this multilateral tactic employed by the EU in this Green 
Paper, may be viewed as the turning point in EU-Russian interdependency from positive 
to negative. 
 “European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” was a 
Green Paper adopted by European Commission in 2006. The Green Paper called for 
implementing a European energy policy based on three main goals: sustainability 
(climate change), competitiveness (opening energy market) and security of supply 
(diversification of energy sources, ensuring access to energy) (European Commision 
2006: 17-18). Exactly as the previous one, this Green Paper also argues that energy 
security can be obtained by constructing a ‘pan-European energy community.’ 
(European Commision 2006: 16). Many scholars believe that there is more in this Green 
Paper than visible at the first glance. Diversifying its energy mix from Russia refers to 
EU’s clear will to decrease or avoid interdependency (Dimitrova 2012: 25). Hadfield 
(2008: 242) stresses that the following Green Paper denies foreign policy implications 
of energy security and avoids the uncomfortable truth of Europe’s own energy market, 
which is rather problematic on both supply and demand sides.  
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 The European Commission’s 2007 strategic energy review “An Energy Policy 
for Europe” approaches energy security and competitiveness in the context of climate 
change. It indicates reductions in energy consumption and once again stresses 
sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply as core energy objectives for 
Europe (European Commission 2007a: 3-4). The other important document from the 
same year, “A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan” sees the security of supply 
as an inter-related challenge with climate change and competitiveness, which requires a 
coordinated response by the EU members (European Commission 2007b: 2). Da Graca 
Carvalho (2012: 20) believes that this plan indicates the shift towards approaching 
energy security in the strong relation with environmental concerns. 
 Probably the most important step towards shaping Common Energy Policy is the 
"Lisbon Treaty", which for the first time formally proposed to constitute a European 
energy policy in the context of primary law. Energy is addressed in the Lisbon Treaty in 
Article 194, Title XXI. EU energy policy is designed in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States in order to create a unified energy market, to ensure security of energy 
supply in the Union, to promote use of renewable energy sources and to build the 
interconnection of energy networks in the EU (Treaty of Lisbon 2008: 108-109). 
 Thus, a pattern of asymmetrical interdependence with the Russian Federation is 
clearly marked in the EU energy policies. The shift to negative interdependence can also 
be spotted, with the EU’s clear attempts to lessen Russia’s influence by ensuring the 
EU’s security of supply and attempts to diversify its suppliers and routes of delivery of 
energy resources. 
Still, as much as a unified EU energy policy towards Russia is discussed, 
significant differences remain between the EU member states, in terms of both their 
policies and their dependence on Russia (Kratochvil & Tichy 2013: 391). Some member 
states still prefer bilateral ties with Russia over the common EU energy policy (Norberg 
2009: 9), for example an agreement between Russia and Germany to build the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline, or the Russian–Italian negotiations on the construction of the South 
Stream gas pipeline (Kratochvil & Tichy 2013: 392). Although the importance of the 
European Union in reducing that kind of bilateralism has been growing, individual 
member states remain important players in the field of energy, thus giving a special 
touch to the issue of energy security for the EU. 
 All in all, Nowak (2010: 57) points out, that there is a need for a cohesive, EU-
wide energy policy to ensure security of supply and reduce demand. It would mean 
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reducing the dependence of the European Union on foreign energy supplies, especially 
from Russia. Nevertheless, the actual creation of such a policy must overcome a few 
obstacles, including member states’ wish to protect their sovereignty, protectionism of 
national industries, and different approaches to Russia among member states. 
 
3.2. Energy security and interdependence in the Russian Federation energy policy 
 Scholars point out that Russian energy strategy is clearly defined by the state 
(Bilgin 2011: 120) and is often seen as an instrument of possible increase of Russian 
influence (Kazantsev 2012: 305). One of the most distinguished characteristic of 
Russia’s energy policy is the fact that the state and Russian energy companies have 
developed a symbiotic relationship and firm’s behavior often derives from Russian 
energy strategy while making investments in Europe (Bilgin 2011: 120). Thus, Russian 
energy policy has paradoxically combined two opposite tendencies: the development of 
competitive market elements and the increase of state influence (Tichy 2012b: 190). 
Neuman (2010: 344-345) stresses that in order to protect future income flows, 
Russia tends to strengthen relations with individual buyers by signing long-term 
contracts, invest in the exploration of new gas and oil fields, build new transport routes 
and maintain existing ones, proliferate into the upstream parts of the energy chain such 
as consumer retail and prove itself as a reliable energy supplier. In return, Russia asks 
its partners to guarantee the security of demand for its energy products (Neuman 2010: 
345). It means that generally, Russia would rather wish a positive interdependence 
evolving. These developments are also visible in Russian energy strategies. 
“The Russian Federation’s Medium Term Strategy” (1999) presented a far more 
vigorous role for energy than conceived of by the EU. For Russia, the ultimate energy 
goal, then, is a joint long-term energy policy in order to create a common European, and 
in the long run, Eurasian energy space, in which Russia plays a key role as an ultimate 
supplier (Strategija razvitija otnoshenij Rossijskoj Federacii s Evropejskim Sojuzom na 
srednesrochnuju perspektivu 2000-2010 gody 1999). Hadfield (2008: 235) sees this 
view as a delusional since on one hand it would increase interdependence between the 
EU and Russia, but the cost of it would be a shift of political power from Western 
Europe to Moscow. 
"The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" (Koncepcyja vneshnej 
politiki Rossijskoj Federacii 2008), sees the European Union as one of the major 
commercial economic and foreign partners. Although it does not include the issue of 
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energy security, it still stresses the need to develop active dialogue with consumer and 
transit countries, once again highlighting Russia’s willingness to strengthen the tie 
between the EU and itself. 
All the major priorities and tasks of Russia's energy policy were formulated in 
“Energy Development Strategy of the Russian Federation.” This strategy 
(Energeticheskaja strategija Rossii na period do 2020 goda 2003) defines the objectives 
of the Russian foreign energy policy. It stresses the importance of Russia’s integration 
into the global energy resource system in the form of cooperation with foreign 
investors. It also sees the EU as one of the main partners and it seems as though Russia 
is eager to continue the dialogue and increase interdependence by inviting European 
investors to new energy projects. 
“Energy strategy of Russia until 2030” (Energeticheskaja strategija Rossii na 
period do 2030 goda 2009) sets priorities for long-term strategic development of 
Russia's fuel and energy complex. In this strategy, energy is openly seen as a tool for 
regaining power in the international relations and as a mean of defense of sovereignty 
from external influences. The necessary level of extraction, the profits of modern 
technologies for extraction and investment in oil and gas fields and infrastructure are 
considered to be the crucial aspects of energy security. According to this strategy, 
energy security is not only the supplier’s but also the consumer’s business. 
Thus, it is clearly visible that Russia would like to preserve a positive 
interdependence with the EU. In doing so, Russia still tries to bond itself individually 
with member states and preferably create bilateral ties. The future of this 
interdependence though seems quite unclear, since maximizing the profit and use of 
energy to achieve a dominant economic and political position in the world can hardly 
assure a vital partnership (Tichy 2012a: 13). 
One of the characteristics of Russian politics aims at creating a “circle of energy 
relations” in its neighborhood, thus competing with the EU (Prange-Gstöhl 2009: 5301). 
It clearly marks a polar opposite to the previously derived attitude, because it is 
basically a wish to weaken Russia’s interdependence with Europe by trying to diversify 
its energy partners. Unluckily for the EU, it creates a situation where the energy security 
of many Eastern European countries depends to a large extent on their relationship with 
Russia and thus on its energy policy. 
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3.3. Energy security and interdependence in the EU-Russia dialogue 
Interdependence has created a strong relationship between the EU and Russia. 
Salem-Haghighi (2007: 301) points out that the ultimate goal of the energy partnership 
between Russia and the European Union is the integration of their energy markets, 
reform of the Russian energy industry and the incorporation of the existing rules of the 
European energy market in Russia. This clearly means that Russia needs strengthening 
as a secure and reliable supplier (Salem-Haghighi 2007: 298), showing the EU’s 
concern about its energy security. The ultimate goal is, however, yet to be achieved, 
since the EU-Russian energy dialogue has been anything but productive. 
The EU-Russia energy dialogue was initiated in the year 2000, but it never really 
gave any constructive result but presented a common ground for exchange of thoughts 
on energy efficiency, environmental security and investment (Norberg 2009: 29). 
Talseth (2012: 17-20) mentions that despite some achievement, such as securing the 
importance of long-term contracts, the energy dialogue still failed its initial task of 
defining a legal framework for the EU-Russia energy trade.  
Although security emerges in the dialogue as one of the aims, for the EU energy 
is a discursive element, whereas Russian participation is based on energy as a foreign 
policy instrument (Hadfield 2008: 237). Seliverstov (2009: 11) also notes that Russia 
would hardly accept EU competition rules as an ultimate goal of energy partnership. It 
almost seems like the dialogue was bound to fail before it even started. 
Still, partners have to consider that substantial interdependency is unlikely to 
vanish in the short to medium-term future (Pick 2012: 324). In this light, Russian 
initiative to strengthen interdependency is at some extent visible in the dialogue 
between the two partners. According to the EU-Russia Centre’s Review (2009: 19) the 
Russian side expressed the wish to expand the scope of the energy dialogue and 
increase the frequency of meetings. A clear parallel is thus visible with Russian energy 
policy. As a supplier, it is of Russia’s interest to expand its relation with the EU and 
increase interdependency. 
As the foregoing chapter shows, energy policies of both the European Union and 
Russia differ significantly. Russia’s energy strategy is clearly based on the state, but 
aims at increasing interdependency with the EU. On the other hand the EU tries to avoid 
even stronger asymmetrical interdependency with the Russian Federation in energy 
sector. Still, why is it so? To answer this question, the vulnerability and sensitivity of 
the two has to be evaluated with the help of the neoliberal prism of interdependency. 
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4. Asymmetry of interdependence as a cause of the issue of energy 
security in the case of the EU and Russia 
Due to its scarce resources, the EU is facing a growing dependency on foreign 
regions not only for the supply of oil but also for the supply of gas (Kjärstad & 
Johnsson 2007: 869). Europe, being close to a large amount of gas reserves, will receive 
most of its gas supplies by pipeline at relatively moderate costs and Russia will remain 
the largest supplier by far (Lochner & Bothe 2009: 1527). 
Russian Federation, on the other hand, possesses within its territory a wealth of 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas) that places it as a first-rate agent in the international energy 
scene. Russia is also one of the few countries in the world that possesses an integrated 
energy sector. It allows Russia to be quite independent of foreign agents (Mane-Estrada 
2006: 3778). Having large resources makes it possible to sell them to the partners. 
European Union with its energy demand and geographical closeness makes a great 
partner to the Russian Federation. 
All that makes the relationship between the two partners extremely 
interdependent since, as pointed out by Tsygankova (2012: 157) for example in 2005, 
Russia supplied natural gas to almost all of the countries in Europe. Baev (2012: 183) 
stresses though that the relations between the two counter-parts cannot be called stable 
and the issue of energy security will therefore remain relevant.  
 This paper suggests that the reason why energy security is stressed so often in 
the relations between the EU and Russia is due to the fact that the EU-Russia 
interdependence is asymmetrical. In order to understand this asymmetry in 
interdependence, both sensitivity and vulnerability of partners’ supply and demand must 
be taken into consideration, since Proedrou (2007: 335) suggests that exactly these two 
factors can push the interdependent parties towards conflict. 
 This chapter thus analyzes how sensitive and vulnerable both partners are in 
terms of energy supply and demand. This analysis will make it possible to understand 
that the issue of energy security between the EU and Russia rises due to the asymmetry 
of their interdependence. 
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4.1. Sensitivity and vulnerability of the EU 
 The high degree of EU dependence on Russian natural resources has been 
driving the European Union to a number of moves aimed at reducing its sensitivity and 
vulnerability. 
 At present, the EU depends on external suppliers for more than 50% of its 
energy requirements, while natural gas is even imported to 64% (European Commission 
2011: 24) therefore making the EU one of the world’s largest energy importers (Helen 
2010: 3). The EU’s dependence on gas imports will rise dramatically and is expected to 
reach 80% in 2030 (European Commission 2007a: 10). Thus, it clearly indicates the 
EU’s huge demand, and Russia with its biggest proven natural gas reserves is 
potentially the biggest supplier (Helen 2010: 4). 
Molis (2011: 89) stresses that due to Russia’s big proportion in gas supplies and 
gas consumption, Russia serves as an important engine for Europe’s economic growth. 
By 2020 the EU will need to import up to 600 bcm
1
 of gas, from approximately 400 
bcm today, and at least half of this demand will have to be sourced from Russia (Weafer 
2009: 22). 
The following graph illustrates the EU’s dependence on the import of Russian 
gas. 
Exporter country Share of imported gas by the EU 
Russia 36% 
Norway 29% 
Algeria 14% 
Qatar 13% 
Nigeria 4% 
Libya 1% 
Trinidad & Tobago 1% 
Egypt 1% 
Other 1% 
 
Graph 2. EU Natural Gas Imports in 2011; based on British Petroleum Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2012 
                                                          
1
 Billion Cubic Metres 
19 
 
 Spanjer (2007: 2890) and Casier (2011: 498) point out though, that looking only 
at the Russian share in EU imports of natural gas might be misleading and thus the level 
of the EU’s supply vulnerability can easily be overrated. If imports are used as a 
criterion it can easily be seen that the EU’s dependence vulnerability is distributed 
highly unevenly over the member states. Mostly the new member states, who are 
historically connected to the Russian gas networks such as Romania, Bulgaria or the 
Baltic States, import nearly all of its gas from Russia. Some member states, such as the 
UK, Portugal and Spain, do not import any Russian gas. Indeed, the countries importing 
all their gas from Russia are highly sensitive and also considerably vulnerable, but it 
cannot really be stated about the EU as a whole (Casier 2011: 498-499). 
 Casier (2011: 499) concludes that although Russia provides 31% of the EU’s gas 
imports, it does not mean, however, that all of this consumed gas is of Russian origin. In 
fact, some member states produce their own gas. This means that Russian gas imports 
provide around 25% of EU gas consumption, making it roughly a quarter. Even more, 
instead of measuring the share of Russian gas in the total EU gas supply, its share in the 
total primary energy consumption can also be measured. This share is only around 
6,5%. Considering that only gas creates real dependence issues, since disruption of gas 
supply can cause deficit of this resource for consumers (Voropai, Senderov & Edelev 
2012: 9), the EU’s effective supply dependence on Russian gas has thus been overrated. 
 Also, the EU can hardly be considered extremely vulnerable due to the fact that 
it put some serious efforts to diversify away from Russian sources. The EU supported 
the construction of different pipelines that will enable Central Asian energy to reach the 
West bypassing Russia. In addition, the EU also promotes a number of other projects 
that will enhance energy deliveries from non-Russian sources (Proedrou 2007: 342) 
 To indicate not such a vulnerable nature of the EU, Proedrou (2007: 341) also 
stresses that the EU will highly unlikely find itself in the situation without any gas. 
Rather it is the dependency on a powerful monopolistic supplier that would put upward 
pressure on prices. Russia can decrease the quantities it offers on the market or demand 
higher prices for the gas it offers. This makes the European Union quite sensitive, which 
the EU tries to avoid with liberalizing its gas market. 
The EU has made attempts to reduce its sensitivity by assuring a constant and 
stable supply, with the help of the energy charter. It would aim at facilitating the secure 
energy supply of the West with the energy resources from the East. Basically it would 
be a transit protocol, according to which the flow of energy would continue regardless 
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of any potential conflicts between states involved in the energy chain (Proedrou 2007: 
341). Since Russia has not signed it, the attempts to reduce sensitivity in this sense, 
have so far failed. 
It can be concluded that the EU’s energy demand is likely to increase and with 
it, the concerns about the security of demand. On the supply side, the EU cannot really 
be considered as vulnerable as often stressed, but the level of EU’s sensitivity is the one 
that should mainly be pointed out in terms of its energy security.  
 
4.2. Sensitivity and vulnerability of the Russian Federation 
Russia is the largest natural gas source, supplying central and south east Europe 
through the Yamal pipeline (Afgan, Carvalho, Pilavachi & Martins 2007: 2519) and its 
share increased even more with the construction of Nord Stream project. But as 
dependent as the EU is on Russian energy, the Russian side also deeply depends on the 
partnership with Europe. 
Of course, Russia is the largest gas provider to the EU but on the other hand the 
EU consumes 90% of Russian gas exports, making the EU a powerful actor in the gas 
relationship with Russia (Le Coq & Paltseva 2012: 643). If Russian energy exports to 
the European Union were significantly reduced, Russia would lose an important part of 
its income. Even though the European countries represent only about 31% of 
Gazprom’s2 total sales volume (Gazprom Group 2013), in 2008 they accounted for 60% 
of its revenues (Söderbergh, Jakobsson & Aleklett 2010: 7829).  
To illustrate the importance of the EU as a customer for the main gas supplying 
energy company of Russia, Gazprom, the following graph can be presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3. Gazprom Group’s gas sales structure in 2012; based on Gazprom Group 
2013 
                                                          
2
 The main gas supplying energy company of Russia. 
Customer Share of overall exports 
Domestic market 54,8% 
Europe (incl. Baltic States) 31% 
Commonwealth of Independent States 14,2% 
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Since that kind of amounts of exported gas to the EU makes Russia very 
sensitive, to reduce the risks, Russia applies several strategies. Firstly, Russia tries to 
hold on to the European energy market by maintaining long-term traditional take-or-pay 
contracts. These contracts ensure gains for the supplier and steady supplies for the 
importer. Secondly, Russia aims at taking advantage of the opportunities that the partial 
liberalization of the European gas market creates. Gazprom tries to enter into and 
dominate the emerging spot markets, where an increasing portion of the gas destined for 
Europe is traded. Last but not least, Russia tries to avoid any third parties in their 
relationship with the EU. It is clearly visible in Russia’s latest contracts with Central 
Asian states, in which Russia tries to maintain a leading position in gas transit (Proedrou 
2007: 336-337). All of these actions create a situation where Russia is eager to make the 
bind with the EU even stronger.  
Casier (2011: 500) adds that the demand dependence of Russia comes clear in its 
wish to reduce its economic dependence on the energy sector. Also, Russia has a lot to 
lose if it risks its reputation as a credible supplier. As a result of supply shortages in 
2006 and 2009, the EU and Russia signed a memorandum on an Early Warning 
Mechanism in case of disruptions of in energy supplies. The Mechanism undoubtedly 
worked since Russia clearly “got the message” when the gas deliveries to Belarus were 
reduced in June 2010.  
Thus, Russia displays considerable demand vulnerability (and at some rate 
sensitivity), exporting most of its gas to the EU (Casier 2011: 506). As a supplier, 
Russia would rather like the interdependence with the EU to be positive, since EU’s 
future energy demand will be of vital importance to Russia (Konoplyanik 2012: 50). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This thesis used neoliberal interdependence theory on the empirical case of the 
issue of energy security in the partnership of the European Union and the Russian 
Federation, to prove that the issue of energy security between the two partners rises due 
to the asymmetrical nature of their interdependence. 
 Keohane and Nye’s theory claims interdependence to be a situation in which 
across state borders, intensive transactions are taking place, entailing certain expenses 
for both partners. However, for one party, the expenses tend to be higher, thus creating 
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the asymmetrical interdependence. The asymmetrical interdependence, which is 
characterized by unequal distribution of gains and expenses, can create a situation when 
dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power. In 
order to understand the role of power in interdependent energy relations, the dimensions 
of sensitivity and vulnerability of two partners must be highlighted. 
 Sensitivity refers to the costs that each side suffers when the other state does not 
offer it the benefits asserted in policy framework. The aspect of vulnerability refers to 
the weakness of one partner, if the other attempts to finish their interdependent 
relationship. Interdependent parties with relatively high vulnerability tend to cooperate 
and strengthen their interdependent relationship (positive interdependence) whereas 
actors with high sensitivity reduce their dependence and search for alternative schemes 
of cooperation (negative interdependence). 
 In the case of energy, the theory of interdependence clearly states that the issue 
of energy security stems from the asymmetrical nature of interdependence of both 
partners. Energy security refers to the availability of a regular supply of energy at an 
affordable price, but it is crucially important to consider the energy demand as well. The 
dimensions of the energy demand and supply can also be clearly presented in the 
connection with the dimensions of sensitivity and vulnerability presented by the theory 
of interdependence. 
 Whilst, the relationship between the EU and Russia in the energy sector can be 
considered really interdependent, the discussion about the issue of energy security 
inevitably rises.  
 The European Union with its huge demand of energy sources often refers to 
Russia as the vital partner in the energy sector. Although the EU cannot be considered 
too vulnerable in their relations with Russia, it still suffers a serious amount of supply 
sensitivity. As pointed out by the interdependence theory, the partner with considerable 
sensitivity often wishes to weaken the interdependence, which is also visible in the case 
of the EU. The Union has made some serious attempts to reduce interdependence with 
Russia by attempting to diversify its suppliers and routes of delivery of energy 
resources, which is also clearly visible in its energy policies. It is thus not the overall 
dependence on Russia that seems to threaten European energy security, but rather the 
uneven exposure across the Member States that can truly harm the energy security of 
the EU. 
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 Russia, on the other hand, possesses a huge amount of supplies and the main 
purchaser of Russian energy resources is the EU. Such strong bond with only one 
partner created the situation, where Russia can truly be considered very vulnerable on 
the demand side. The clear signs of Russia’s wish to see the interdependence with the 
EU as positive are also quite obvious. As the main revenues come from the Union, 
Russia seeks ways to strengthen the relationship even more by wishing to engage in 
long-term contracts.  
 Hence it is possible to conclude that the hypothesis has been proved. The 
perception of energy security by both partners is strongly influenced by the 
asymmetrical interdependence of the two, with Russia trying to strengthen the 
interdependence due to its demand vulnerability and the EU trying to weaken it due to 
its supply sensitivity. 
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Kokkuvõte:  Energiajulgeoleku mõiste Venemaa ja Euroopa Liidu suhetes: 
uued vastastikused sõltuvused 
 Käesolev bakalaureusetöö analüüsib energiajulgeoleku problemaatikat Vene 
Föderatsiooni ja Euroopa Liidu partnersuhetes Robert O. Keohane ja Joseph S. Nye 
sõnastatud neoliberaalse vastastikuse sõltuvuse teooria alusel. Töö eesmärgiks oli välja 
selgitada, kas energiajulgeoleku problemaatika Venemaa ja Euroopa Liidu suhetes allub 
vastastikuse sõltuvuse teooria põhimõtetele, millest üldse tuleneb energiajulgeoleku 
problemaatika kahe partneri suhetes ning kuidas mõlemad osapooled suhtuvad 
vastastikku sõltuvusse. Töö käigus püstitati hüpotees: „Energiajulgeoleku 
problemaatika Venemaa ja Euroopa Liidu suhetes kerkib esile vastastikuse sõltuvuse 
ebavõrdsuse tõttu, kus Venemaa üritab tarnijana sõltuvust suurendada enda nõudluse 
haavatavuse tõttu, ning Euroopa Liit soovib pigem negatiivset sõltuvust enda tarnete 
tundlikkuse tõttu“. 
 Töö teoreetiline raamistik põhineb Keohane ja Nye teoorial. Nende kahe 
akadeemiku väitel eksisteerib kahe partneri vahel tihtipeale vastastikune sõltuvus. Siiski 
on alati olemas mõjukam partner, mis tekitab vastastikuse sõltuvuse ebavõrdsuse. 
Taoline ebavõrdsus tekitab olukorra, mil võimekam osapool võib kasutusele võtta 
jõulisemaid meetmeid enam sõltuva partneri suhtes. Selleks, et mõista partnerite 
käitumist ebavõrdses sõltuvuses, on tarvis hinnata partnerite haavatavust ja tundlikkust. 
Haavatavus viitab partneri nõrkusele suhte katkemise korral ning tundlikkus ühe 
partneri nõrkusele teise partneri lepingutingimuste täitmatajätmise korral. Teooria järgi 
üritavad suurema tundlikkusega partnerid sõltuvust vähendada ning suurema 
haavatavusega sõltuvust tugevdada. 
 Kuna antud teooria on olnud rahvusvahelises poliitökonoomias kasutusel juba 
mõnda aega, saab selle kaudu seletada ka partneritevahelisi energiasuhteid ning paljuski 
aitab see aru saada energiajulgeoleku problemaatikast. Kuna energiasuhetes on 
vastastikune sõltuvus eriti aktuaalne, peab arvestama nii tarne- kui ka nõudluse 
julgeolekuga. Vastastikuse sõltuvuse teooria seob nõudluse ja tarnimise haavatavuse ja 
tundlikkusega, mis kokkuvõttes võimaldabki seletada energiajulgeoluku problemaatikat. 
 Venemaa Föderatsioon ning Euroopa Liit on energiasektoris teineteisest tugevalt 
sõltuvuses ning energiajulgeoleku küsimus on kahe partneri suhetes seega üpris oluline. 
Mõlema osapoole energiapoliitikad on vaatamata tugevale seotusele siiski erinevad ning 
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sellest tulenevalt on erinevad ka kahe poole arusaamad, milline peaks olema 
nendevaheline vastastikune sõltuvus. 
 Euroopa Liidul on suur energianõudlus, mille rahuldamisel on Venemaa energial 
suur osa. Tihtipeale viidatakse Venemaa osale siiski kui ebaproportsionaalselt suurele 
ning just suhetes Venemaaga on energiajulgeoleku problemaatika üks aktuaalsemaid. 
Mitmete energiakatkestuste tõttu võib Euroopa Liitu pidada partnersuhetes Venemaaga 
tarnete osas küllaltki tundlikuks. Vältimaks tulevikus liigsest tundlikkusest tulenevaid 
probleeme, üritab Euroopa Liit vastastikust sõltuvust oma energiapoliitika abil 
vähendada. EL’i energiapoliitikas on selgelt sõnastatud soov tarneid mitmekesistada 
ning vähendada Venemaalt imporditava energia hulka. Siiski ei saa Euroopa Liidu 
energiapoliitikat pidada küllalt ühtseks, mistõttu sõltuvus Venemaa energiast ei vähene 
veel niipea. 
 Venemaa, kui üks maailma suurimaid energiasaaduste eksportijaid vajab enda 
energiale aga kindlaid ostjaid, milleks on juba aastakümneid olnud Euroopa Liit. Just 
seepärast, et enamik Venemaa tulusid eksporditavast energiast tuleb Euroopa Liidust, 
võib Venemaad pidada energiasuhetes Euroopa Liiduga küllaltki haavatavaks nõudluse 
osas. Kuigi Venemaa energiapoliitika on selgelt riigikeskne ning paljuski vastandub 
Euroopa Liidu energiapoliitikale, üritab Venemaa vastastikku sõltuvust Euroopa 
Liiduga veelgi enam tugevdada, sest teist nii tulusat partnerit Venemaal hetkeseisuga ei 
ole. 
 Sellest järeldub, et energiajulgeoleku küsimus kerkib Venemaa ja Euroopa Liidu 
suhetes esile eelkõige ebavõrdse vastastikuse sõltuvuse tõttu. Tarnete suhtes tundlik 
Euroopa Liit üritab ebavõrdset vastastikku sõltuvust vähendada, samas kui nõudluse 
suhtes haavatav Vene Föderatsioon üritab vastastikku sõltuvust veelgi tugevdada. 
  
 
 
